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The Financial Capacity Of Nonprofit Hospitals by Nancy M. Kane
Over the past decade policy analysts have developed an interest in measuring hospitals' financial performance, which has ramifications for health care access, cost, and quality.
1 More recently, some cities and states have attempted to assess the financial capacity of hospitals to provide more community services. This paper summarizes the findings and policy implications raised by such an assessment of the twelve nonspecialty teaching hospitals in Boston.
Judith Kurland, former commissioner of health and hospitals in Boston, commissioned me to prepare a report on the hospitals' financial resources. She was concerned that hospitals and neighborhood health centers serving economically disadvantaged areas were underfunded. Meanwhile, private, nonprofit hospitals affiliated with Boston's three major medical schools were engaged in capital investments on an un- 
Nancy Kane is a lecturer on management in the
Public Accountability
I noted two obstacles to a broader public awareness of hospital finances in my report: hospitals' complex organizational and reporting structures, and hospitals' aggressively conservative accounting practices. These obstacles may explain why the report's findings took many in the city by surprise.
While corporate accounting standards increasingly require the consolidation and full disclosure of related affiliates, the same is not true of hospital accounting. The existence, assets, and composition of major fundraising, investing, and operating entities related to hospitals are not disclosed in hospital financial statements. Moreover, the IRS 990 forms submitted by hospital affiliates often are not readily available or are not filed in a timely manner.
Entities related to Boston's twelve teaching hospitals accumulated assets worth $1 billion, none of which was reported in the hospitals' financial statements. Affiliates of Children's Hospital alone amassed close to $500 million. Six other hospitals also retained significant assets in their affiliates. The affiliates consisted of a mixture of fundraising organizations and operating subsidiaries (for example, outpatient surgery centers and home health agencies).
In addition to the complex organizational structures, aggressively conservative accounting practices helped some hospitals to accumulate large cash reserves while claiming low profit margins. Hospital accounting guidelines allow a large degree of managerial discretion in calculating revenues. Nonprofit hospitals also lack selfinterested investors to "police" financial statements. What is needed is a public forum where hospitals fully disclose their financial performance and that of all affiliated entities. Public meetings with large purchasing alliances or state monitoring agencies established by health care reforms, for example, might constitute such a forum. The validity and usefulness of hospital financial information could be evaluated for rate negotiation and other purposes.
Cash Accumulation
The aggregate unrestricted cash balance as of 1992 exceeded $1 billion, after allowances for industry-standard "working capital" cash reserves equal to twenty days of operating expenses.
2 This "discretionary" cash totaled almost 63 percent of the hospitals' long-term debt. In the debate over the reasonableness of such cash balances, a number of standards have been proposed. Most fail to consider the attendant costs to taxpayers and premium payers.
One hospital financial expert proposed that the appropriate standard should be average cash balances at the level of university-affiliated hospitals with an "A" bond rating, or ninety days of operating expenses.
3
Most hospitals, as well as most corporations, do not maintain cash balances at this level. The Standard and Poor's 400 Industrial median value for days of operating cash during this period was between fifteen and twenty days. 4 Another expert suggested that cash balances should be equal to 50 percent of the replacement cost of a hospital's entire investment in plant and equipment.
5 This is a ludicrously expensive proposal. It also ignores the fact that hospitals borrow (on a tax-subsidized basis) 80 to 90 percent of the costs of acquiring plant and equipment. Another "standard" proposed was that hospitals accumulate every dollar of cash that they can in order to survive in an uncertain payment environment. While this proposal may make sense from an institutional perspective, it is an expensive proposition for premium payers.
The mentality that hospitals should accumulate large discretionary cash reserves has contributed to Massachusetts's high per capita health care costs. Discretionary cash has been used for competitive purposes rather than to make health care more accessible and affordable. For instance, the wealthier hospitals have purchased physi- cian practices and satellite facilities in higher-income communities and have acquired duplicative "state-of-the-art" technology. These purchases have increased health care costs because hospitals seek to recover the acquisition costs through patient charges. Capital purchases also enable already wealthy hospitals to draw patients away from more affordable community hospitals and community health centers.
A more reasonable, affordable standard for discretionary cash balances is needed. Some states, for instance, have allowed rates that permitted the accumulation of cash balances equal to a fixed percentage (such as 20 percent) of the costs of replacing "needed" buildings and equipment.
Levels Of Debt And Capital Investment
Debt represents a significant financial risk for Boston hospitals. The twelve nonspecialty hospitals raised $1.8 billion in long-term debt (as of 1992) to fund capital expenditures totaling $2.2 billion. Most of the dollars were spent upgrading inpatient buildings and equipment during a period of declining inpatient admissions. A quarter of the debt, or $454 million, was incurred in 1992 alone-and by only four hospitals. Capital costs (depreciation and interest) grew 10 to 25 percent per year, well above the growth rate of noncapital costs. How did this happen?
Given hospitals' large cash balances, which in some hospitals exceeded total long-term debt, it is easy to understand why the $1.8 billion was lent. Wall Street faces high demand for tax-exempt "paper." Investors generally will finance any tax-exempt project that looks viable from the bondholders' perspective. Meanwhile, the state's certificate-of-need (CON) program has lacked the political will to say "no" to hospitals requesting permission to build new facilities. Especially during the deep recession of the past four to five years, creating jobs has taken precedence over containing health care costs. Massachusetts tax and premium payers will pay for this policy over the next twenty to thirty years.
Some hospital executives have claimed that their capital development plans were made a decade ago and could not be altered as inpatient overcapacity became evident in the mid-to-late 1980s. This argument is simply not credible. Inpatient overcapacity is a systemic problem of which the hospitals were well aware. The institutional response to this problem has been to upgrade and renovate facilities in order to compete for a declining patient base. The same phenomenon occurred in California in the early 1980s. From the perspective of the community and health care payers, this "capital arms race" is a gross misallocation of health care resources. As health reform considers containing health care costs, stronger, more centralized measures to contain the capital arms race must be considered.
Hospital Priorities
Several private hospital executives have suggested that Boston City Hospital (BCH)-the city's main provider of care to the uninsured, minorities, and the economically disad vantaged-shou ld be closed. BCH lost paying patients to private teaching hospitals during the 1980s and faces an uncertain future. The private hospital executives say that BCH patients could be treated at their hospitals.
Community advocates and city leaders, however, have expressed skepticism about the willingness of the teaching hospitals to provide unprofitable, unglamorous services to a population with special needs. As if to prove the point, just after the report was issued, two hospitals discontinued unprofitable programs in acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) screening and substance abuse. Clearly, the research, teaching, and tertiary care missions of the strongest Boston hospitals suggest a set of priorities different from those of much of the community. Are competitive pressures reinforcing economic priorities over social needs?
Several policies have been proposed to address the community needs issue. One
